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I. 
STATMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The above-named Appellant, Britt Colleen Burton (hereafter called "Burton") was 
arrested for Driving Under While Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in violation of 
Idaho Code $18-8004. She was stopped for failing to signal when two uphill lanes 
merged into one while she continued to travel in the right lane. Burton filed a timely 
Request for Administrative License Suspension (ALS) Hearing pursuant to Idaho Code 
$ 18-8002A. The hearing was held, at which time Burton alleged that Idaho Code $49- 
808(1) was unconstitutionally void as applied because it failed to provide fair notice that 
signaling is appropriate when roadway design results in two lanes into one and that the 
same section is unconstitutionally void as applied because it fails to establish minimum 
guidelines as to what is an "appropriate signal" to govern enforcement of the statute. 
The ALS hearing officer sustained the suspension after testimony and argument. Burton 
filed a Petition for Judicial Review, after which the District Court held that Idaho Code 
$49-808 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and that reasonable cause existed 
for the underlying traffic stop. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On August 26,2007, Burton was arrested, charged with DUI and served with an 
Idaho Code $18-8002A Suspension Advisory. 
On August 29, 2007, Burton filed a Request for Administrative Hearing. 
On September 17,2007 an ALS Hearing was held. 
On September 20,2007, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
sustaining the proposed suspension of driving privileges was issues by the hearing 
officer. 
On September 27,2007, Burton filed a Petition for Judicial Review. 
On April 13,2009, the District Court filed an Opinion and Order Re: Appeal, 
denying Burton's claims that the statute was unconstitutionally applied. 
On May 26,2009, Burton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court. 
11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 26,2007, at approximately 2:36 a.m., Burton was traveling out of St. 
Maries, Idaho, on Highway 3. A.L.S. Hrg. Transcr. 9:3-10; R. 29 (Sept. 17,2007). The 
highway was essentially a two-way highway. Id. at 16-19, At some point, as the 
highway climbed a hill, the single lane for the direction Burton was traveling expanded to 
include a left-hand passing lane and the regular right-hand lane in which Burton was 
traveling. Id. at 9:20-10:3; R. 29-30 As Burton climbed further up the hill, she passed a 
sign indicating that the lanes were going to merge. Id, at 10:18-23; R. 32. The sign did 
not indicate which lane ended but only that the lanes were merging. Id. at 12:5-8. Burton 
did not signal when she passed that sign because she did not understand that she was 
required to signal when a passing lane disappears and she is traveling in the regular, 
right-hand lane going up a hill. Id at 11 :5-7; 11:ll-15; R.31 
Shortly after the left passing lane ended, Burton was pulled over by Deputy Sidney 
E. Hilton (hereafter "Hilton") of the Benewah County Sheriff's office. Id. at 10: 15-17; R. 
30. Hilton told Burton that he pulled her over because she failed to signal when the two 
lanes became one. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 10:ll-14, 11:s-10; R. 31. At no time did Burton 
turn or exit the highway. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 11 :23-12:4; R. 3 1. 
A subsequent investigation by Hilton led to a charge of DUI, and Burton was 
served with aNotice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing. Court's Exh. 1:5. 
In accordance with statutory provisions, Burton requested an administrative hearing on 
August 29,2007. Court's Exh. 1: 23-25. 
The administrative hearing was conducted on September 17,2007. Court's Exh. 
1:50. Burton testified at the hearing as described above. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 6:16-12:10, 
R. 23-34. Burton offered as exhibits the Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in 
Support, which she had filed in Benewah County District Court relative to her DUI 
charge. ALS Hrg. Transcr. 5:3-6:5; Court's Exh. 1: 36-49. Said motion and 
memorandum in support argued that I.C. $49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied 
to Burton because it fails to provide fair notice that her conducted is proscribed by the 
statute and it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern enforcement of the statute. 
Burton's argument relied on the Memorandum Decision and Order of Fifth District 
Magistrate Judge Israel, which was attached to the memorandum in support as Exhibit A. 
Court's Exh. 1: 47-49. 
In paragraph 1 of his Findings of Fact, Administrative Hearing Examiner Eric G. 
Moody (hereafter "Moody") stated that Burton's void for vagueness argument was not 
one on which an ALS hearing officer could rule and that he could not vacate Burton's 
license suspension based on that argument. Court's Exh. 1: 50-58. Therefore, he held 
that Hilton had legal cause to stop Burton and sustained the suspension of her driver's 
license. R. 048.05 1. 
111. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether I.C. $ 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case 
because it fails to provide fair notice that signaling is appropriate when roadway design 
necessitates merging from two lanes into one. 
B. Whether I.C. 5 49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void as applied to this case 
because it fails to establish minimal guidelines as to what is an "appropriate signal" to 
govern enforcement of the statute. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Legal Standard 
On judicial review, the District or Supreme Court may set aside the 
administrative hearing officer's decision if the Court determines that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were, among other things, in violation of 
constitutional or statutory provisions. I.C. 5 67-5279(3). This includes arguments that a 
statute or ordinance on which the agency's decision relied is void for vagueness. See 
Cowan v. Bd. of Commissioners ofFremont County, Docket No. 30061 (2006); Dupont 
v. Idaho State Board of Commissioners, 134 Idaho 6 18 (2000). 
B. Argument 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be "worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and that it 
be "worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,7 11 (2003). 
Therefore, a statute is void for vagueness if it "fail[s] to provide fair notice that the 
defendant's conduct was proscribed or fail[s] to provide sufficient guidelines such that 
the police had unbridled discretion" in enforcing the statute. Id. at 712. The statute 
involved in this matter, I.C. $49-808(1) is unconstitutionally void for both of these 
reasons. 
A statute is facially vague if it is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications," 
i.e. invalid En toto. Id. However, even if a statute is not facially vague it may still be 
vague "as applied" to a particular defendant's conduct. Id. Burton is not arguing that 
I.C. 5 49-808(1) is facially void but, rather, that it is void as applied to her conduct. 
1. I.C. 5 49-808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because 
It Fails to Provide Fair Notice that Signaling is Appropriate When Roadway 
Design Necessitates Merging from Two Lanes into One. 
I.C. 5 49-808(1) states: 
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or 
left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until 
the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an 
appropriate signal. 
In State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663,666 (Ct. App. 1999), the court held that failing 
to signal at the end of a passing lane constituted "movement" and violated this statute. 
However, as pointed out by Fifth District Magistrate Judge Israel, the court was divided 
and its opinion sent mixed signals. See Memorandum Decision and Order, State v. Dale, 
Blaine County Case No. CR-2007-0783 dated June 6,2007, Court's Exh. I:  47-49. 
As Judge Israel's decision points out, the Dewbre court refused to consider 
whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague because that issue was not raised below. 
See Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 667. Although Chief Judge Perry's opinion states that I.C. $ 
49-808 is plain and unambiguous, as Judge Israel states, this does not rule out an as 
applied vagueness argument or there would have been no reason for the court to 
I 
1 specifically leave that argument open. See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 043, 
I 
Despite Chief Judge Perry's statement, I.C. $49-808 is hardly plain and 
unambiguous, or, if it is plain and unambiguous, it can be palpably absurd 
as applied to many situations. Is weaving within a lane without a turn 
signal a violation of the statute? Is swerving to avoid a deer without a turn 
signal a violation of the statute? Is going around a bend in the road 
without a turn signal a violation of the statute? Consistent with Judge 
Perry's reasoning, the answer is yes, yet almost no one would apply the 
statute to these situations. 
I While being required to signal if weaving within a lane or swerving to avoid a 
deer, are situations that stretch the imagination, going around a bend in the road is not. 
! 
I Proceeding forward on a road that makes anywhere from a 45' - 90' turn is not. 
I Proceeding through the roundabouts that seem to be more and more in vogue is not. In 
I fact, signaling in these latter situations would actually constitute a hazard. 
Passing lanes often begin on inclines so slower traffic can stay right. The passing 
lane then expires at the crest of a grade, where both lanes become one. Thus, it is the 
lanes that merge and not the driver. It is preposterous to think that a vehicle proceeding 
forward to the right of a passing lane, who remains in that lane throughout (and may even 
be passed by other cars) needs to signal to lawfully continue moving forward. In the 
present case, Burton was proceeding down a two land highway and came upon a passing 
lane. She stayed in the right-hand land, never changing direction, exiting or merging. 
The divided nature of the Dewbre opinion, itself, supports Defendant's argument 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the present case. In the main 
opinion, Chief Judge Perry states that he is "constrained" to find that the defendant's 
action violated the statute "until further clarification is provided by the Idaho legislature." 
Id. at 666. 
In addition, in his concurring opinion, Judge Schwartzman points out that "many 
an Idaho driver would, in custom and practice, see no need to operate a turn signal in this 
hyper-technical situation." Id. at 667. Therefore, even Judge Schwartzman would agree 
that the statute does not give adequate notice to Idaho drivers of "presumably ordinary 
intelligence" that a signal is required under the circumstances of this case. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, Court's Exh. 1: 47-49. 
This is reiterated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Pro Tem McDermott in which 
he states that common sense dictates that the word "move" in the statute "does not 
require a driver to signal where the driver, obeying the posted traffic signs, remains in the 
right-hand lane until the highway's structure forces the driver to merge" into the 
remaining lane and that such a requirement "may confuse, rather than alert, other 
drivers." Id. at 667-668. 
Further, because the term "appropriate signal" is not defined in the Idaho Code, a 
person of ordinary intelligence is left to wonder when a signal is appropriate and, 
therefore, required. The vagueness doctrine does not require every word in a criminal 
statute to be statutorily defined. State v. Casano, 140 Idaho 461,464 (Ct. App. 2004). 
However, "a statute must be construed so that effect is given to every word and clause of 
the statute" and "words and phrases are construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language." Dewbre, 133 Idaho at 656. Therefore, effect must be 
given to the word "appropriate" as it is used in this statute. 
"Appropriate" is defined as "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, person, 
occasion" (htt~:l/~~wv.dictionary.com, accessed Oct. 15,2009) or "suitable for the 
occasion or circumstances" (http:ll.cvw.ei~carta.msn.coin, accessed Oct. 15,2009). 
Therefore, inclusion of the word "appropriate" in the statute implies that there are 
situations in which the use of a signal is not appropriate. The situations quoted above 
from Judge Israel's Memorandum and Decision make clear that there are many situations 
in which a signal is not necessary or appropriate. However, because the statute provides 
no definition of the term "appropriate signal," (e.g. when other traffic is present and your 
"movement" could impede or interfere with their "movement"), people of ordinary 
intelligence are left to wonder when a signal is appropriate. In fact, there are many 
situations, including the one presently before the court, in which "the appropriate signal 
under the circumstances was just as likely no signal at all." See Memorandum Decision 
and Order, Court Exh. I: 49. 
Burton was traveling in the right-hand lane of a highway that narrowed from two 
lanes to one. Therefore, the design of the highway forced Burton to continue forward in 
the same direction without turning as the two lanes became one. While the lanes merged 
(as a manner of speaking), Burton no more merged or changed lanes by remaining in the 
reight hand lane than someone in the left hand land in the same place may have merged 
or changed lanes. Thus, it becomes an issue of who (in the two lanes) becomes the 
merger, changes direction or changes lanes. The result, according to the Appellee's 
position would actually require parties in both lanes to signal. Hence, one could envision 
a situation where a driver in the left-hand lane, in such a situation, would signal a right- 
hand turn and a driver in the left-hand lane would signal to turn left, even though both 
continued in the same direction with neither turning . There was no other traffic in the 
vicinity at the time whose travel was potentially impeded or interfered with by Burton's 
action. Therefore, it is likely that the "appropriate signal" in this situation was no signal 
at all. However, because the statute fails to provide notice to people of ordinary 
intelligence whether the terms "movement" and "appropriate signal" include such 
situations, it is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation and, therefore, void. 
2. I.C. 8 49-808(1) is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to This Case Because 
it Fails to Provide Sufficient Guidelines as to When a Signal is Appropriate 
Thereby Giving Police Unbridled Discretion in Enforcing the Statute. 
A law that does not provide minimal guidelines for enforcement "impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad 
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application." State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 586 (1990). This failure to provide minimal 
guidelines for enforcement is often "what tolls the death knell" for a statute. Id. at n. 4. 
This is "perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine." Id. (quoting 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)). 
In Bitt, a city loitering and prowling ordinance was struck down as failing to 
provide sufficient enforcement guidelines. 118 Idaho at 590. Under the ordinance, a 
person could not be arrested or convicted unless he failed to identify himself and offer an 
explanation for his presence and conduct. Id. However, the ordinance did not provide 
any guidelines for what constituted credible and reliable identification and, therefore, 
gave police officers complete discretion to make that determination. Id. at 589-590. 
Although that ordinance was found to be facially void, the reasoning is equally applicable 
in this "as applied" vagueness challenge. 
Similar to Bitt, I.C. $49-808(l)'s use of the phrase "appropriate signal" without 
providing further enforcement guidelines impermissibly gives officers complete 
discretion to decide who is and who is not violating the statute. Although a facial 
challenge of I.C. $49-808(1) might not prevail because there are obvious situations in 
which a person of ordinary intelligence would understand a signal to be appropriate, the 
statute is vague as applied to Burton's conduct. 
As discussed above, the situations quoted from Judge Israel's Memorandum and 
Decision demonstrate that there are many situations in which a signal is not necessary. 
Not only does the statute's failure in defining the phrase "appropriate signal" leave a 
person of ordinary intelligence wondering when a signal is "appropriate," this failure to 
provide minimal guidelines provides police with unbridled discretion in determining 
whether the statute has been violated. As noted by Judge Israel, "the minimal guidelines 
meant to establish the enforcement of the law are at best in flux." See Memorandum 
Decision and O~dey, Court's Exh. 1: 47-49. 
Therefore, I.C. $49-808(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Burton 
because it fails to provide minimal guidelines as to when a signal is appropriate thereby 
giving police officers unbridled discretion in enforcing the statute. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Because I.C. $49-808(1) is void for vagueness and because Moody relied on 
that statute in making his decision that the officer had legal cause to stop Burton, his 
order sustaining the administrative suspension of Burton's driver's license should be 
vacated. 
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